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Abstract
The role of Poverty Alleviation Programs (PAP) in ghting poverty
and ensuring the satisfaction of basic economic needs is well known. How-
ever, informational asymmetries create the need for adequate instruments
to prevent fraud.
This paper provides a static model of adverse selection where the gov-
ernment (principal) aims to minimize the costs of a PAP that ensures
that all individuals have access to an exogenously dened minimum in-
come level.
Agents may di¤er in their income-generating ability and disutility of
labor. Under the di¤erent informational environments, we study the ef-
fectiveness of workfare (that involves unpaid and unproductive work in
the public sector) as a screening device, based on the comparison with
standard monitoring.
We nd that when disutility of labor is the only unobservable variable,
a workfare policy is ine¢ cient because it crowds outprivate sector work
and signicantly increases the costs of the program. Under this informa-
tional context, monitoring may be the best instrument for preventing
fraud. When income-generating ability is the only unobservable variable,
choosing between workfare and monitoring depends not only on the cost
function associated with the latter, but also on income distribution. The
analysis of this case would suggest that a workfare policy might be inef-
cient in the context of undeveloped countries where income distribution
exhibits strong inequalities, but appropriate in developed ones. These
conclusions suggest that a mixed policy combining workfare and monitor-
ing may be optimal when both income-generating ability and disutility of
labor are unknown.
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fare.
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1 Introduction
Risks are part of everyday life. But the impact on the poor and other vulnerable
groups, such as the elderly and disabled, are often more immediate and more
threatening than those faced by others in society. These risks can be associated
with a household (i.e. illness, disability or death, and unemployment), with a
community or region (i.e. oods, famine) or a country (i.e. drought, global
nancial crisis, shifts in terms of trade). The adverse e¤ects of these risks will
be far more damaging to the poor than to those better-o¤ in terms of income,
physical and mental well-being, and long-term human development. For poor
people, lost income may force them to sell their land, their livestock or their
tools, send their children to work rather than to school, or eat less. These drastic
measures may help families survive from day to day, but they will make it that
much harder for these families to escape poverty in the future.
Governments and international nancial institutions can play an important
role in helping households manage daily risks and cope with losses whenever
they occur. The notion that Poverty Alleviation Programs (PAP) should be
a permanent feature of social policy and not simply a temporary response to
crisis is now increasingly embraced by the international development community.
During economic downturns, problems are much more serious and immediate
and the appeals for public action are impossible to deny. But even when a
country prospers, some households will still face hard times.
Cross-country experience in design and implementation of programs con-
rms that appropriate program choice, program design, and delivery are key to
reaching the poor successfully. Although controversial, the possibility of con-
ditioning entitlement to social assistance on a work requirement for its bene-
ciaries (workfare) has become more and more accepted in the design of modern
welfare systems in Europe and in the United States. The stated reasons for
workfare vary. Broadly, there are three main arguments for introducing work-
fare. The rst presents workfare as a screening tool when individuals di¤er with
respect to valuations of leisure or earning capacity. The purpose of screening is,
of course, improving the targeting of transfers. A second reason for considering
workfare is the deterrent argument: if benet claimants are required to sub-
stitute work for leisure, they may be more eager to leave unemployment. The
third motive is directly connected to the rst two: the screening and deterrent
e¤ects of workfare may also make income transfers to the poor more politically
acceptable .
Although workfare itself is not a new concept, only recently has it been
developed on a rigorous theoretical basis in public nance literature. Essentially
two classes of social objectives are considered, one being conventional welfarist
and the other being non-welfarist. With welfarist objectives, the government
is only concerned with individual welfare as given by the individualspreferences.
In the usual setup, this implies that the policy maker cares about individuals
consumption of goods as well as their demand for leisure. A utilitarian objective
function is the prime example of a welfarist social objective. If the government
has non-welfarist objectives, it may give zero weight to the value of leisure and
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focus exclusively on income.
Workfare models have in general been based on the contributions of Besley
and Coate (1992,1995) which provide a detailed analysis of workfare as an in-
come maintenance (or poverty alleviation) program. They introduce a static
model of adverse selection in which the primary aim of the social planner is to
minimize the costs of a PAP and also ensure that all individuals are above a
minimum income level, when income-generating ability is unobservable. Work-
fare takes the form of a requirement to work in an unproductive public-sector
job. They analyse two distinct incentive arguments to justify the use of work
requirements in such programs: a screening argument suggesting it may serve as
a means of giving transfers only to deserving individuals and a deterrent argu-
ment defending it is a device to encourage poverty-reducing investments such as
acquiring additional education. In case workfare is implemented, it crowds out
some private-sector output by reducing time spent in private-sector work. It is
shown that workfare may be part of a cost-minimizing policy when the govern-
ment is unable to observe wage rates and incomes and also when incomes (but
not wage rates) are observable. In a two-class model (Besley and Coate, 1992),
the high ability individuals are o¤ered no benets whereas those claiming to be
of low ability are o¤ered an income transfer in exchange for a work requirement.
However, those of high ability have no incentive to pretend to be of low abil-
ity. In fact, the optimal work requirement is chosen so as to make high-ability
individuals indi¤erent between claiming to be of low ability and receiving no
benet at all. The optimality of workfare is more likely to occur if there is a
large wage di¤erential between high and low ability workers and if the fraction
of low-ability workers is small relative to the whole target population. When
those conditions are met, the crowding-out e¤ect from workfare is modest and
the cost-saving from excluding high-ability workers from benets dominates the
crowding-out e¤ect.
The optimality of workfare within a welfarist approach has been examined
by Cu¤ (2000). The individuals in this model di¤er along two dimensions:
ability and disutility of labor. It is shown that it may be part of the optimal
package to impose a work requirement on low ability individuals who have a
low disutility of labor. Cu¤ also shows that workfare is never optimal when all
individuals have the same ability, unless they are more productive in workfare
than in the private sector. Beaudry and Blackorby (1998) derive a similar result.
They consider workfare in a utility maintenance program where the objective
is to maximize a social welfare function. They also demonstrate that workfare
may be welfare-improving if some individuals lack private-sector opportunities.
In the latter case, introduction of workfare would not crowd out private-sector
output due to reduced labor supply among low-ability individuals.
Tranaes and Thustrup Hansen (1999) adapt the workfare theory to unem-
ployment insurance (UI). They consider the use of work requirements to address
moral hazard problems arising from di¢ culties in monitoring job search e¤orts.
They present a formal analysis of workfare in a model where individuals may
have the same productivity but di¤er with respect to their preferences for leisure.
There are two types of individuals referred to as workers (with low disutility of
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labor) and non-workers (with high disutility of labor). The government knows
the distribution of individual characteristics but not the preferences of a partic-
ular individual. Job search e¤ort and job acceptance decisions are also private
information of the individuals. The paper examines whether workfare can be a
Pareto improving welfare reform, i.e., whether it is possible to improve welfare
for one type of individuals without worsening conditions for the other type. The
answer is a¢ rmative: workfare works as a welfare improving screening device
if individuals are su¢ ciently heterogeneous with respect to their valuations of
leisure. By introducing a work requirement, the government can induce non-
workers to self-select out of the UI system, the reason being that they have a
strong preference for leisure. At the margin, it is possible to simultaneously raise
UI benets and introduce a work requirement so as to make non-workers indif-
ferent between claiming and not claiming UI benets. The rise in UI benets
represents a strictly positive welfare improvement for workers.
In the contributions discussed above, standard monitoring does not take
place as a screening device. The economics literature dealing with monitoring
and sanctions in the context of UI is small and of recent origin, and it is non-
existing in the context of PAP. There is however a growing literature on optimal
law enforcement that is of relevance for the analysis of optimal UI design. Recent
surveys of the literature are conducted by Garoupa (1997) and Polinsky and
Shavell (2000).
The problem with monitoring is that it is not a free good. The theoretical
literature on law enforcement has some fairly clear implications on this matter.
The more costly monitoring is, the less should be spent on monitoring activities
and the larger should the penalties for commiting fraud be. The crucial di¢ culty
is to quantify the costs of monitoring. No empirical estimates appear to exist
in this area.
Our paper intends to provide a static model of adverse selection where the
government aims to minimize the costs of a PAP that ensures that each indi-
vidual in the economy has access to an exogenously dened minimum income
level. We extend Besley and Coates (1992) framework in order to research new
issues regarding poverty relief. Under di¤erent informational environments, we
study the e¤ectiveness of workfare as a screening device based on a comparison
with standard monitoring. Furthermore, since disutility of labor (possibly re-
lated to physical or intellectual handicaps, distance to the work place or even
simple laziness) represents an important factor in labor decisions, we allow
agents to di¤er not only in their income-generating ability but also in their la-
bor disutility. In what follows, we analyze the optimal PAP when disutility of
labor or income-generating ability are unobservable and try to infer results for
an environment where both characteristics are unobservable.
Our results suggest that the informational environment may be crucial for
the determination of the optimal program. When disutility of labor is the only
unobservable variable (for a given income-generating ability), a workfare policy
is ine¢ cient because it crowds outprivate sector work increasing the size of the
poverty gap and the costs of the program. When only income-generating ability
is unobservable, choosing between workfare and monitoring depends not only
4
on the cost function associated with the latter but also on income distribution.
The analysis of this case suggests that a workfare policy may be ine¢ cient in the
context of countries where most people exhibit low income levels. Under these
results, a mixed policy that combines monitoring and workfare will generally
be superior to welfare only solutions (giving the minimum income level to all
agents in the economy).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
and 4 analyze the potential of, respectively, standard monitoring and workfare
as instruments to prevent fraud whenever either disutility of labor or income-
generating ability are unobservable. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
In what follows we present a multidimensional static model of adverse selection
where the principal (government) is concerned with ensuring that each individ-
ual gets at least an exogenously dened level of income z, at minimum scal
cost. Thus, only those who earn less than z should be assisted. Following Besley
and Coate (1992), we set aside the revenue-raising implications of the budget re-
quired to nance government transfers and focus mostly on poverty-alleviation
issues.
We consider an economy consisting of a set I of individuals. Letting the
subscript i denote an individual agent in I = f1; :::; ng ; individual agents may
di¤er in their income-generating ability wi 2 [w;w], and disutility of labor
ki 2

k; k

. Individual types are exogenous and observable to the individual
but not to the government. Let w = (wi)i2I and k = (ki)i2I : All variables are
independent and f(w; k) is the joint probability density function (pdf). The
conditional pdfs are denoted by f(w) and f(k).
For each agent i; let xi be consumption, l total time available for work, li
total number of hours of work, and let ti denote non-labor income (possibly
a government transfer). We assume individual utilities to be quasilinear in
income: U(xi; li) = xi   kih(li); where h(:) is strictly increasing and strictly
convex. We further assume that h 1l (w=k) = 0 and that both wh
 1
l (w=k) > z
and wh 1l (w=k) > z (i.e. an agent with either the lowest disutility of labor or
the highest ability always receives an income that is above z):
Individual i solves the following problem:
max
xi;li
U(xi; li) = xi   kih(li)
s.t. xi  wili + ti
0  li  l
It is easy to show that the optimal xi and li are respectively xi = wil

i + ti
and li = h
 1
l (
wi
ki
). Letting l(wi; ki)  h 1l (wiki ); li = l(wi; ki) and we conclude
that l is increasing in wi and decreasing in ki. Notice that h(:) is common to all
agents and so is l:Moreover, quasilinearity implies that there is no substitution
e¤ect and therefore l does not depend on ti.
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3 Monitoring
In this section the government aims to minimize the costs of the PAP, ensuring
that all individuals in the economy are willing to participate and have access to
at least z. Under di¤erent informational contexts, we study the e¤ectiveness of
standard monitoring used as the only instrument to prevent fraud, based on a
comparison with the pure welfare case, where the government hands out z to
all individuals in the economy.
The instruments available to the government are a monitoring degree q,
where 0  q  1 is interpreted as the probability of detecting individual fraud,
penalties for committing fraud p = (pi)i2I ; and transfers t = (ti)i2I : The Gov-
ernment does not have the ability to force participation on the PAP. Thus,
population must be induced to participate.
The cost of monitoring is dened as g(q): It is assumed that g(0) = 0,
g0(q) > 0, g00(q) > 0 and limq!1 g(q) = limq!1 g0(q) =1: The latter assumption
implicitly says that a PAP with q = 1 would not be cost-minimizing.
Using t, q and p; the government tries to guarantee that each agent reveals
her true type rather than mimicking another one.
3.1 Finding the optimal PAP when k is unobservable
3.1.1 The Complete Information Problem
To illustrate the adverse selection problems arising under incomplete informa-
tion we start by analyzing the complete information case. In this case, gov-
ernment aims to nd the optimal PAP when k is known and w is xed at w.
Thus, government knows both the vector of individual income-generating abili-
ties (where all elements of the vector coincide) and that of individual parameters
of labor disutility before designing the program.
Under this informational context, the problem is:
min
t;q;p
P
i ti + g(q)
s.t.
t  0; 0  q  1; p  0
(PCk) wli + ti   kih (li )  wli   kih (li ) for all i () ti  0 for all i
(MIk) wli + ti  z for all i
PCk ensures that all individuals are willing to participate in the program
and MIk states that all individuals in the economy have a minimum income of
z.
From the individual maximization problem we know that li = h
 1
l (
w
ki
).
With monitoring as the only instrument to prevent fraud, li remains the same
as in the absence of any PAP, and equals the amount of labor for the private
sector. The complete information solution is such that ti = max fz   wli ; 0g :
This result shows that the agents who benet from the program are those with
ki 2

w=hl(
z
w ); k

i.e. the agents whose income is below z. The poorest agents
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- those with disutility of labor k - receive the highest transfer, that equals z.
Transfers decrease to zero as k decreases.
It is easy to see that the rst-order condition for q is g0(q) = 0. Therefore,
there is no monitoring under complete information.
3.1.2 The Incomplete Information Problem
We now assume that the planner cannot observe k: However, w is common
knowledge and it is the same for all agents (and equal to w). In what follows
we simplify the notation and write l(ki) = l(w; ki).
Given that each ki is private information, the principal needs to design a
type-contingent contract: besides determining q; the contract must specify ti(ki)
and pi(ki) for all i such that each agent will have an incentive to announce the
true value of ki in the associated direct revelation game. We therefore need
additional constraints to the maximization problem of the previous section:
ICk is the incentive compatibility constraint that ensures truthful revelation
and MIPk guarantees that, even when agents are caught committing fraud, the
penalty is such that they still have a nal income of at least z1 .
(ICk) (1 q)
n
wl(ki) + ti(bk)  kih [l(ki)]o+q fwl(ki) + ti(ki)  pi(ki)  kih [l(ki)]g 
wl(ki) + ti(ki)  kih [l(ki)] for all (i; ki;bk)
(MIPk) wl(ki) + ti(ki)  pi(ki)  z for all (i; ki)
The principal wants to minimize the expected cost of the program: Ek(
P
i ti(ki))+
g(q) =
P
iEki(ti(ki)) + g(q): Rewriting constraints PCk and MIk; the problem
becomes2 :
min
q;fti(ki);pi(ki)gi2I ;
P
iEki(ti(ki)) + g(q)
s.t. t  0; 0  q  1; p  0
(PCk) wl(ki)+ti(ki) kih (l(ki))  wl(ki) kih (l(ki)) for all (i; ki)()
ti(ki)  0 for all (i; ki)
(ICk) (1 q)
n
wl(ki) + ti(bk)  kih [l(ki)]o+q fwl(ki) + ti(ki)  pi(ki)  kih [l(ki)]g 
wl(ki) + ti(ki)  kih [l(ki)] for all (i; ki;bk)
1This constraint is imposed because the penalty threat must be credible. Otherwise, we
could think of an innite penalty that would ensure truthful revelation, but this penalty would
contradict the primary goal of the program: that no individual income is below the minimum
survival level z.
2 If truthful revelation is ensured, the government could use all the information contained
in the vector k to determine each ti: Instead of ti(ki);we could consider instead Ti(k) and
let ti(ki) = Ek i (Ti(k)): ICk and PCk would then be interim Bayesian constraints where
each agent would take into account only ti(ki): MIk and MIPk would instead be ex post
requirements where Ti(k) should be used instead. The versions of MIk and MIPk that we
use would nevertheless be implied by those ex post requirements. Once we derive the optimal
ti(ki) in our simplied version of the problem, setting Ti(k) = ti(ki) yields the exact same
value for the objective function and satises all the constraints of the more general problem.
We therefore focus only on this simplied version.
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(MIk) wl(ki) + ti(ki)  z for all (i; ki)
(MIPk) wl(ki) + ti(ki)  pi(ki)  z for all (i; ki)
Given that all agents are equal ex ante, we look for a symmetric solution i.e.
we look for functions t(ki) and p(ki) such that ti(ki) = t(ki) and pi(ki) = p(ki)
for all i:
Before presenting a solution to the problem, notice that our assumption on
g(q) su¢ ces to ensure q < 1: Notice also that MIk is implied by MIPk together
with the non-negativity constraint imposed on the penalty: wl(ki) + t(ki) 
wl(ki)+t(ki) p(ki)  z, and so we can ignore MIk. PCk is, in turn, equivalent
to the non-negativity of t: Finally, notice that the inequality in ICk may be
rewritten as t(ki) +
q
1 qp(ki)  t(bk):
Lemma 1 If disutility of labor is unobservable (for a xed w), a cost-minimizing
PAP is such that the maximum transfer is attributed to ki = k and equals z i.e.
t(k) = maxki t(ki) = z:
Proof. Let k be such that t(k) = maxki t(ki) and t(k
) > z: Then from
ICk, t(ki)+
q
1 qp(ki)  t(bk); for all bk: Since t(k)  t(ki) for all ki; we only need
to ensure that t(ki) +
q
1 qp(ki)  t(k) > z: It follows that t(ki) > z  q1 qp(ki)
(1). From MIPk; p(ki)  wl(ki) + t(ki)   z. Manipulation of this condition
yields z   q1 qp(ki)  z   q1 q [wl(ki) + t(ki)  z] (2). Combining (1) and (2);
we have t(ki) > z  q1 q [wl(ki) + t(ki)  z] and t(ki) > z qwl(ki) (for all ki):
Instead let t(ki) = max fz   qwl(ki); 0g and p(ki) = wl(ki) + t(ki)   z  0:
It is straightforward to check that all the constraints are satised and for the
same q total expected costs are smaller. Therefore, the solution must be such
that t(ki)  z for all ki: Also, from MIk, t(k)  z and therefore ti(k) = z =
maxki t(ki).
Lemma 2 If disutility of labor is unobservable (for a xed w), a cost-minimizing
PAP is such that t(ki) = max fz   qwl(ki); 0g for all ki:
Proof. Since t(k) = maxki t(ki) = z; we can rewrite ICk as t(ki)+
q
1 qp(ki) 
z for all ki: Combined with MIPk; this implies the requirement that t(ki) 
z   qwl(ki) for all ki: For any given q 2 [0; 1) ; solving a simplied maximiza-
tion problem subject only to the latter requirement and to the non-negativity
constraints yields the result t(ki) = max fz   qwl(ki); 0g for all ki: Finally, set-
ting p(ki) = wl(ki)+t(ki) z ensures MIPk and non-negativity of the penalties
in the original problem.
Recall that l(ki) = h 1l (w=ki): For 0 < q < 1; let k0 be the highest level
of labor disutility that leads to a 0 transfer i.e. let k0 be such that k0 =
w=hl (z=qw) < w=hl (z=w) (and k < w=hl (z=w) by assumption). From this
result we can conclude that every agent i such that w=hl (z=w) > ki > k0
has a private income that exceeds z but receives a transfer from the PAP. The
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principal is therefore paying informational rents to those agents. Moreover, the
principal is paying informational rents to every agent i such that k0 < ki < k
i.e. to all types getting positive transfers (except for k) . As q goes to 1; k0 goes
to w=hl (z=w) and, although monitoring costs increase, the government saves
on informational rents. As q goes to 0; so does k0 and therefore k > k0 i.e. all
agents with ki 2

k; k

receive an informational rent.
Lemma 3 If disutility of labor is unobservable (for a xed w), a cost
minimizing PAP includes a positive degree of monitoring if and
only if g0(0) < jIjE(wl(ki)), in which case q is implicitly dened by
g0(q) = jIj R k w
hl( zqw )
wh 1l (
w
ki
)f(ki)dki:
Proof. As q ! 0; w
hl( zqw )
! 0 < k: By continuity, there is a q0 > 0 such
that k = w
hl

z
q0w
 :
We can then substitute the expression for t(ki) in the principals objective
function and rewrite it as
jIj
Z k
k

z   qwh 1l (
w
ki
)

f(ki)dki + g(q) for q  q0
jIj
Z k
w
hl( zqw )

z   qwh 1l (
w
ki
)

f(ki)dki + g(q) for q > q0:
The function is continuous and so is its rst derivative
  jIj
Z k
k
wh 1l (
w
ki
)f(ki)dki + g
0(q) for q  q0
  jIj
Z k
w
hl( zqw )
wh 1l (
w
ki
)f(ki)dki + g
0(q) for q > q0
Notice that, since f(ki) = 0 for ki  k, the derivative can be rewritten as
  jIj R k w
hl( zqw )
wh 1l (
w
ki
)f(ki)dki + g
0(q) for q 2 (0; 1): We thus have an interior
solution q 2 (0; 1) if and only if
g0(q) = jIj
Z k
w
hl( zqw )
wh 1l (
w
ki
)f(ki)dki:
Given our assumptions, q = 1 is never optimal. By continuity, if g0(0) <
limq!0 jIj
R k
w
hl( zqw )
wh 1l (
w
ki
)f(ki)dki, then there exists an interior solution.
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If, however, g0(0)  jIjE(wl(ki)) = jIj
R k
k
wh 1l (
w
ki
)f(ki)dki; then q = 0 is
optimal and, for q > 0; we have g0(q) > g0(0)  jIj R k w
hl( zqw )
wh 1l (
w
ki
)f(ki)dki;
ruling out an interior solution.
Starting from the benchmark case of no monitoring, an innitesimal increase
in q decreases costs, via the government transfers, by the expected value of the
total income of the agents in the economy. Therefore, in case the economy
is very poor, or if the innitesimal increase in q represents a comparatively
very large cost, monitoring will not be an optimal instrument. Naturally, if
the former is true, the revenue-raising implications of the budget required to
nance government transfers would also prove to be prohibitive. Having the
marginal cost associated with achieving an innitesimally small probability of
detecting fraud be larger that the total expected income in the economy is also
not very realistic. Therefore, the most interesting case is the one for which
g0(0) < jIjE(wl(ki)):
Under the additional assumption that g0(0) < jIjE(wl(ki)); we can now
combine the Lemmas to fully characterize the optimal PAP:
Proposition 4 If disutility of labor is unobservable (for a xed w),
the cost-minimizing PAP includes:
 a monitoring degree q such that g0(q) = jIj R k w
hl( zqw )
wh 1l (
w
ki
)f(ki)dki;
 and transfers t(ki) = max fz   qwl(ki); 0g for all ki:
3.2 Finding The Optimal PAP When W is Unobservable
3.2.1 The Complete Information Problem
In this case, government aims to nd the optimal PAP when w is known and k is
xed at k. Thus, government knows both the vector of individual parameters of
labor disutility (where all elements of the vector coincide) and that of individual
income-generating abilities before designing the program.
Under this informational context, the problem is:
min
t;q;p
P
i ti + g(q)
s.t.
t  0; 0  q  1; p  0
(PCw) wili + ti   kh (li )  wili   kh (li ) for all i () ti  0 for all i
(MIw) wili + ti  z for all i
PCw again ensures that all individuals are willing to participate in the pro-
gram and MIw states that all individuals in the economy have a minimum income
of z.
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The complete information solution is such that ti = max fz   wili ; 0g : Letew be such that ewhl   ewk  = z: Our result shows that the agents who benet from
the program are those with wi 2 [w; ew] i.e. the agents whose income is below
z. The poorest agents - those with income-generating ability w - receive the
highest transfer, that equals z. Transfers decrease to zero as w increases. Once
more, since the rst-order condition for q is g0(q) = 0, there is no monitoring
under complete information.
3.2.2 The Incomplete Information Problem
We now assume that the planner cannot observe w: However, k is common
knowledge and it is the same for all agents (and equal to k). In what follows we
simplify the notation and write l(wi) = l(wi; k).
Given that each wi is private information, the principal needs to design
a type-contingent contract: besides determining q; the contract must specify
ti(wi) and pi(wi) for all i such that each agent will have an incentive to announce
the true value of wi in the associated direct revelation game. We again need
additional constraints to the maximization problem of the previous section:
ICw is the incentive compatibility constraint that ensures truthful revelation
and MIPw guarantees that, even when agents are caught committing fraud, the
penalty is such that they still have a nal income of at least z.
(ICw) (1 q) fwil(wi) + ti( bw)  kh [l(wi)]g+q fwil(wi) + ti(wi)  pi(wi)  kh [l(wi)]g 
wil
(wi) + ti(wi)  kh [l(wi)] for all (i; wi; bw)
(MIPw) wil(wi) + ti(wi)  pi(wi)  z for all (i; wi)
The principal wants to minimize the expected cost of the program: Ew(
P
i ti(wi))+
g(q) =
P
iEwi(ti(wi))+g(q): Rewriting constraints PCw and MIw; the problem
becomes:
min
q;fti(wi);pi(wi)gi2I ;
P
iEwi(ti(wi)) + g(q)
s.t. t  0; 0  q  1; p  0
(PCw) wil(wi)+ti(wi) kh (l(wi))  wil(wi) kh (l(wi)) for all (i; wi)()
ti(wi)  0 for all (i; wi)
(ICw) (1 q) fwil(wi) + ti( bw)  kh [l(wi)]g+q fwil(wi) + ti(wi)  pi(wi)  kh [l(wi)]g 
wil
(wi) + ti(wi)  kh [l(wi)] for all (i; wi; bw)
(MIw) wil(wi) + ti(wi)  z for all (i; wi)
(MIPw) wil(wi) + ti(wi)  pi(wi)  z for all (i; wi)
The problem is similar to the one with the unobservable k: Given that all
agents are equal ex ante, we again look for a symmetric solution i.e. we look for
functions t(wi) and p(wi) such that ti(wi) = t(wi) and pi(wi) = p(wi) for all i:
Once more, our assumption on g(q) su¢ ces to ensure q < 1: Also, MIw can
be ignored because it is implied by MIPw together with the non-negativity con-
straint imposed on the penalty. PCw is again equivalent to the non-negativity
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of t:We state without proof the following results (the proofs are similar to those
for the case where k is unobservable):
Lemma 5 If individual income-generating ability is unobservable (for a xed
k), a cost-minimizing PAP is such that the maximum transfer is attributed to
wi = w and equals z i.e. t(w) = maxwi t(wi) = z:
Lemma 6 If individual income-generating ability is unobservable (for a xed
k), a cost-minimizing PAP is such that t(wi) = max fz   qwil(k); 0g for all wi:
For 0 < q < 1; let w0 be such that w0h
 1
l (w0=k) = z=q. Recalling that ew
is such that ewh 1l ( ew=k) = z then w0 > ew (and w > ew by assumption). From
this result we can conclude that every agent i such that ew < wi < w0 has a
private income that exceeds z but receive transfers from the PAP. The principal
is therefore paying informational rents to those agents - and indeed to every
agent i such that w < wi < w0. As q goes to 1; w0 goes to ew and, although
monitoring costs increase, the government saves on informational rents. As q
goes to 0; w0 becomes arbitrarily large and therefore w0 > w i.e. all agents with
wi 2 (w;w] receive an informational rent.
Lemma 7 If individual income-generating ability is unobservable (for a xed k),
a cost-minimizing PAP includes a positive degree of monitoring if and
only if g0(0) < jIjE(wil(wi)), in which case q is implicitly dened by
g0(q) = jIj R w0
w
wih
 1
l (
wi
k )f(wi)dwi:
Again, the most interesting case is the one for which g0(0) < jIjE(wil(wi))
and under that additional assumption; we can now fully characterize the optimal
PAP:
Proposition 8 If individual income-generating ability is unobservable (for a
xed k),
the cost-minimizing PAP includes:
 a monitoring degree q such that g0(q) = jIj R w0
w
wih
 1
l (
wi
k )f(wi)dwi; where
w0 is implicitly dened by w0h
 1
l (w0=k) = z=q;
 and transfers t(wi) = max fz   qwil(wi); 0g for all wi:
4 Workfare
In this section the government aims to minimize the costs of the PAP, ensuring
that all individuals in the economy are willing to participate and have access
to at least z. Under di¤erent informational contexts, we study the e¤ectiveness
of a workfare program used as the only instrument to prevent fraud, based on
a comparison with the pure welfare case, where the government hands out z to
all individuals in the economy. We therefore consider q = 0.
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Under a worfare system, agent i receives transfer ti but is required to put in
an amount of work ri in the public sector and therefore max fli   ri; 0g is the
time spent working in the private sector. Work in the public sector is assumed to
be non-productive i.e. a mere screening instrument that produces net prots of
0: The instruments available to the government are therefore transfers t = (ti)i2I
and workfare r = (ri)i2I . Using t and r; the government tries to guarantee that
each agents reveals her true type rather than mimicking another one.
4.1 Finding The Optimal PAP When K Is Unobservable
4.1.1 The Complete Information Problem
To illustrate the adverse selection problems arising under incomplete informa-
tion we again start by analyzing the complete information case. In this case,
government aims to nd the optimal PAP when k is known and w is xed at w.
Thus, government knows both the vector of individual income-generating abili-
ties (where all elements of the vector coincide) and that of individual parameters
of labor disutility before designing the program.
Under this informational context, the problem is:
min
t;r
P
i ti
s.t.
t  0; r  0
(PCk) wmax fli   ri; 0g+ ti   kih (max fli ; rig)  wli   kih (li ) for all i
(MIk) wmax fli   ri; 0g+ ti  z for all i
PCk ensures that all individuals are willing to participate in the program
and MIk states that all individuals in the economy have a minimum income of
z.
From the individual maximization problem we know that li = h
 1
l (
w
ki
).
Workfare does not a¤ect li . The complete information solution is such that
ri = 0 and ti = max fz   wli ; 0g for all i: This result shows that the agents who
benet from the program are those with ki 2

w=hl(
z
w ); k

i.e. the agents whose
income is below z. The poorest agents - those with disutility of labor k - receive
the highest transfer, that equals z. Transfers decrease to zero as k decreases.
4.1.2 The Incomplete Information Problem
We now assume that the planner cannot observe k: However, w is common
knowledge and it is the same for all agents (and equal to w). In what follows
we simplify the notation and write l(ki) = l(w; ki).
Given that each ki is private information, the principal needs to design a
type-contingent contract: the contract must specify ti(ki) and ri(ki) for all
i such that each agent will have an incentive to announce the true value of
ki in the associated direct revelation game. We therefore need an additional
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constraint to the maximization problem of the previous section: ICk is the
incentive compatibility constraint that ensures truthful revelation.
(ICk) wmax fl(ki)  ri(ki); 0g+ti(ki) kih (max fli (ki); ri(ki)g)  wmax
n
l(ki)  ri(bki); 0o+
ti(bki)  kihmaxnli (ki); ri(bki)o for all (i; ki;bki)
The principal wants to minimize the expected cost of the program: Ek(
P
i ti(ki)) =P
iEki(ti(ki)): Rewriting constraints PCk and MIk; the problem becomes:
min
fti(ki);ri(ki)gi2I ;
P
iEki(ti(ki))
s.t. t  0; r  0
(PCk) wmax fl(ki)  ri(ki); 0g+ti(ki) kih (max fli (ki); ri(ki)g)  wl(ki) 
kih (l
(ki)) for all (i; ki)
(ICk) wmax fl(ki)  ri(ki); 0g+ti(ki) kih (max fli (ki); ri(ki)g)  wmax
n
l(ki)  ri(bki); 0o+
ti(bki)  kihmaxnli (ki); ri(bki)o for all (i; ki;bki)
(MIk) wmax fl(ki)  ri(ki); 0g+ ti(ki)  z for all (i; ki)
Given that all agents are equal ex ante, we look for a symmetric solution i.e.
we look for functions t(ki) and r(ki) such that ti(ki) = t(ki) and ri(ki) = r(ki)
for all i:
We present a set of lemmas that lead us to our proposition. The rst one
is a direct consequence of MIk applied to k, ICk with bki = k for all ki; and
cost-minimization.
Lemma 9 If r(k) = 0; the optimal PAP attributes z to all individuals and
r(ki) = 0 for all ki:
Lemma 10 If the optimal PAP is such that r(k) > 0 = l(k); then r(ki)  r(k)
for all ki < k:
Proof. Assume not. Let ki be such that r(ki) < r(k):There are three
possible cases:
1. l(ki)  r(k) > r(ki)
Then, ICk for ki and bki = k and ICk for k and bki = ki respectively yield:
t(ki)  t(k) + w(r(ki)  r(k)) (1)
t(ki)  t(k) + k(h(r(ki))  h(r(k))) (2)
Then wr(k) kh(r(k))  wr(ki) kh(r(ki)): Since r(k) > r(ki)  l(k) =
0; and the agents utility function is concave, we reach a contradiction
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2. r(k) > r(ki)  l(ki)
Then, ICk for ki and bki = k and ICk for k and bki = ki respectively yield:
t(ki)  t(k) + ki(h(r(ki))  h(r(k))) (3)
t(ki)  t(k) + k(h(r(ki))  h(r(k))) (4)
But then (k   ki)(h(r(ki))  h(r(k)))  0 and we reach a contradiction.
3. r(k) > l(ki) > r(ki)
Let k0 = sup

ki : r(k) > l
(ki) > r(ki)
	
:
If k0 = k; then from MIk applied to k; t(k)  z: Let ki be arbitrarily
close to k: Since l(ki) > r(ki) and l(ki) is arbitrarily close to 0; so is
r(ki): Also, MIk applied to ki implies t(ki)  z   "; with " arbitrarily
close to 0: But then ICk for k and bki = ki is violated: t(k)   kh(r(k)) <
t(ki)  kh(r(ki)), " < k(h(r(k))  h(r(ki))):
Therefore, k0 < k: From (2), we know that r(kj)  r(k) for kj > k0
(and for kj = k0 whenever k0 =2

ki : r(k) > l
(ki) > r(ki)
	
: Therefore, in
any " neighborhood of k0; we can nd ki and kj such that ki < kj and
r(ki) < l
(kj) < l(ki) < r(kj): Then ICk for ki and bki = kj and ICk for
kj and bkj = ki respectively yield:
t(ki)  t(kj) + ki(h(l(ki))  h(r(kj)))  w(l(ki)  r(ki)) (5)
t(ki)  t(kj) + kj(h(l(kj))  h(r(kj)))  w(l(kj)  r(ki)) (6)
Then wl(ki)   kih(l(ki))   (wl(kj)   kjh(l(kj)))  (kj   ki)h(r(kj)):
Letting v(ki) denote the value function associated with the utility max-
imization problem, v(ki) = wl(ki)   kih(l(ki)) and, from the envelope
theorem, dv=dki =  h(:): Applying a rst-order Taylor expansion of v(ki)
around kj ; we can approximate v(ki)   v(kj) by  h(l(kj))(ki   kj) =
(kj   ki)h(l(kj)): Since r(kj) > l(kj); we reach a contradiction.
Using the previous lemmas, we can now characterize the optimal PAP:
Proposition 11 If labor disutility is unobservable (for a xed w), the cost-
minimizing PAP is the pure welfare program:
- r(ki) = 0 and t(ki) = z for all i.
Proof. If the optimal PAP is such that r(k) > 0 = l(k); then r(ki)  r(k)
for all ki < k: From MIk applied to k; t(k)  z: But then incentive compatibility
implies that t(ki)  t(k)  z for all ki < k and the pure welfare program would
be the cost-minimizing PAP:
This analysis suggests that a workfare policy might be ine¢ cient if labor
disutility is the prominent cause of low incomes, because it crows-outprivate
sector work, increasing the size of the poverty gap and the costs of the program.
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4.2 Finding The Optimal PAP When W Is Unobservable
4.2.1 The Complete Information Problem
To illustrate the adverse selection problems arising under incomplete informa-
tion we again start by analyzing the complete information case. In this case,
government aims to nd the optimal PAP when w is known and k is xed at
k. Thus, government knows both the vector of individual parameters of la-
bor disutility (where all elements of the vector coincide) and that of individual
income-generating abilities before designing the program.
Under this informational context, the problem is:
min
t;r
P
i ti
s.t.
t  0; r  0
(PCw) wimax fli   ri; 0g+ ti   kh (max fli ; rig)  wili   kh (li ) for all i
(MIw) wimax fli   ri; 0g+ ti  z for all i
PCw ensures that all individuals are willing to participate in the program
and MIw states that all individuals in the economy have a minimum income of
z.
From the individual maximization problem we know that li = h
 1
l (
wi
k ).
Workfare does not a¤ect li . The complete information solution is such that
ri = 0 and ti = max fz   wili ; 0g for all i: Let ew be such that ewhl   ewk  = z:
Our result shows that the agents who benet from the program are those with
wi 2 [w; ew] i.e. the agents whose income is below z. The poorest agents - those
with income-generating ability w - receive the highest transfer, that equals z.
Transfers decrease to zero as w increases.
4.2.2 The Incomplete Information Problem
We now assume that the planner cannot observe w. However, k is common
knowledge and it is the same for all agents (and equal to k).
Given that each wi is private information, the principal needs to design a
type-contingent contract that must specify ti(wi) and ri(wi) for all i such that
each agent will have the incentive to announce the true value of wi in the as-
sociated direct revelation game. We therefore need an additional constraint to
the maximization problem of the previous section: ICw is the incentive compat-
ibility constraint that ensures truthful revelation.
(ICw) wimax [l(wi)  ri(wi); 0] + ti(wi)   khmax [l(wi); ri(wi)] 
wimax [l
(wi)  ri( bwi); 0]+ti( bwi) khmax [l(wi); ri( bwi)] for all (i; wi; bwi)
Rewriting constraints PC and MI, the problem becomes:
min
ti(wi);ri(wi)
P
iEwiti(wi)
16
s.t. t  0; r  0
(PCw) wimax [l(wi)  ri(wi); 0] + ti(wi)   khmax [l(wi); ri(wi)] 
wil
(wi)  kh [l(wi)] for all (i; wi)
(ICw) wimax [l(wi)  ri(wi); 0] + ti(wi)   khmax [l(wi); ri(wi)] 
wimax [l
(wi)  ri( bwi); 0]+ti( bwi) khmax [l(wi); ri( bwi)] for all (i; wi; bwi)
(MIw)wimax (l(wi)  ri(wi); 0) + ti(wi)  z for all (i; wi)
We again look for a symmetric solution i.e. functions t(wi) and r(wi) such
that ti(wi) = t(wi) and ri(wi) = r(wi) for all i.
We present a set of lemmas that lead us to our proposition. The rst one
is a direct consequence of MIw applied to w, ICw with bwi =w for all wi; and
cost-minimization.
Lemma 12 If r(w) = 0; the optimal PAP attributes z to all individuals and
r(wi) = 0 for all wi:
Lemma 13 If the optimal PAP is such that r(w) > 0 = l(w); then there must
be a wi s.t. r(wi) < l(wi):
Proof. If r(wi)  l(wi); for all wi; then from MIw, t(wi)  z for all wi;
and for all wi such that wil(wi) > z, PCw implies that t(wi) > z: Therefore,
welfare would result in a smaller total cost.
Lemma 14 If l(wi) > r(wi); then for all w0i > wi; we have r(w
0
i)  r(wi):
Proof. Assume not. Let w0i > wi and r(w
0
i) > r(wi): If l
(w0i) > l
(wi) 
r(w0i) > r(wi); then ICw for wi and bwi = w0i and ICw for w0i and bwi = wi
respectively yield:
t(wi)  t(w0i) + wi(r(wi)  r(w0i)) (7)
t(wi)  t(w0i) + w0i(r(wi)  r(w0i)) (8)
But then (w0i   wi)(r(wi)  r(w0i))  0 and therefore r(wi)  r(w0i).
Now if w0i > wi and r(w
0
i) > r(wi) where l
(w0i) > r(w
0
i) > l
(wi) > r(wi);
if r is continuous in [wi; w0i] then there exists a w
00
i such that l
(w00i ) > l
(wi) 
r(w00i ) > r(wi) and we reach a contradiction. If there is a positive discrete
jump in r at some w00i i.e. l
(w00i   ") > l(wi)  r(wi)  r(w0i   ") for all
" 2 (0; l(w00i )   l(wi)) but l(w00i ) > r(w00i ) > l(wi) > r(wi), then for some
" su¢ ciently small, l(w00i ) > l
(w00i   ")  r(w00i ) > r(wi)  r(w0i   ") and we
again reach a contradiction.
Finally if w0i > wi and r(w
0
i) > r(wi) where r(w
0
i)  l(w0i) > l(wi) > r(wi);
again continuity of r would su¢ ce for a contradiction. If there is a positive
discrete jump in r at some w00i i.e. l
(w00i   ") > l(wi)  r(wi)  r(w0i   ") for
all " 2 (0; l(w00i )   l(wi)) but r(w00i ) > l(w00i ) > l(wi) > r(wi); then ICw for
wi and bwi = w00i and ICw for w00i and bwi = wi respectively yield:
t(wi) + wi(l
(wi)  r(wi))  kh(l(wi))  t(w00i )  kh(r(w00i )) (9)
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t(w00i )  kh(r(w00i ))  t(wi) + w00i (l(w00i )  r(wi))  kh(l(w00i )) (10)
But then t(wi)+wi(l(wi) r(wi)) kh(l(wi))  t(wi)+w00i (l(w00i ) r(wi)) 
kh(l(w00i )) and therefore wil
(wi)   kh(l(wi))  w00i l(w00i )   kh(l(w00i )): But
this contradicts the fact that l( ewi) results from the maximization of ewil kh(l)
and that, from the envelope theorem, d( ewil( ewi) kh(l( ewi)))d ewi = l( ewi) > 0 for allewi >w.
Therefore, r is non-increasing for all wi > w0 = inf fwi : l(wi) > r(wi)g :
Therefore, for wi < w0; we have r (wi)  l(wi): Set r (w0)  l(w0) as well
(which does not a¤ect our results given that there is a continuum of agents).
Lemma 15 For all wi < w0; we have r(wi)  l(w0):
Proof. We know that r(wi)  l(wi): If r (w0)  l(w0) > r(wi)  l(wi);
then ICw for w0 and bw0 = wi and ICw for w0i and bwi = w0 respectively yield:
t(w0)  kh(r(w0))  t(wi) + w0(l(w0)  r(wi))  kh(l(w0)) (11)
t(wi)  kh(r(wi))  t(w0)  kh(r(w0)) (12)
But then t(wi)   kh(r(wi))  t(wi) + w0(l(w0)   r(wi))   kh(l(w0)) and
w0r(wi) kh(r(wi))  w0l(w0) kh(l(w0)); which is only possible for r(wi) =
l(w0) and we reach a contradiction.
Again, given that we have a continuum of agents, we set r (w0) = l(w0) as
well (which does not a¤ect our results).
Lemma 16 In a cost-minimizing PAP all agents such that wi  w0 have the
same level of utility.
Proof. For any wi  w0 and wj  w0; ICw for wi and bwi = wj and ICw for
wj and bwj = wi combined yield t(wi)  kh [r(wi)] = t(wj)  kh [r(wj)] : We can
then set t(wi)  kh [r(wi)] = c; where c is a constant, for all wi  w0:
Lemma 17 In a cost-minimizing PAP all agents such that wi  w0 have
r(wi) = r(w0) and t(wi) = t(w0).
Proof. From PCw for all wi  w0; c+ kh [r(wi)]  kh [r(wi)]  wil(wi) 
kh [l(wi)] i.e. c  wil(wi)  kh [l(wi)] and provided this inequality is met for
w0 = argmaxwwiw0 wil
(wi)  kh [l(wi)] ; it will hold for all wi  w0: Also,
it follows that c  0:
From MIw; we just need to ensure that t(wi)  z for all wi  w0:
From our previous result stating that t(wi)  kh [r(wi)] = c for all wi  w0;
it is clear that ICw for any wi  w0 and for any bwi = wj > w0 does not depend
on r(wi): Also, for any wj > w0 and wi  w0; ICw for wj and bwj = wi yields:
wj [l
(wj)  r(wj)]+t(wj) kh [l(wj)]  wj max [l(wj)  r(wi); 0]+t(wi) kh [max(l(wj); r(wi)]
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Letting t(wi) = c+kh(r(wi)); if l(wj)  r(wi); this reduces to wj [l(wj)  r(wj)]+
t(wj)  kh [l(wj)]  c: If l(wj) > r(wi); this reduces to wj [l(wj)  r(wj)] +
t(wj)   kh [l(wj)]  wj [l(wj)  r(wi)] + c + kh(r(wi))   kh (l(wj)) : The
right hand side of this inequality is decreasing in r(wi) : its rst derivative is
 wj + kh0(r(wi)) < 0 since l(wj) > r(wi) and h00 > 0: The constraint may
only be binding for wi such that r(wi) is minimal i.e. for wi = w0:
We had that for all i such that wi  w0; r(wi)  r(w0) = l(w0): For cost
minimization, we can now set r(wi) = r(w0) for all i such that wi  w0 and
still meet all the constraints, letting t(wi) = c+ kh(r(k0)) = t(w0):
Using the previous lemmas, we can now characterize the optimal PAP:
Proposition 18 Let w0 be such that w0l(w0) = z: If income-generating ability
is unobservable (for a xed k), the cost-minimizing PAP consists of:
- r(wi) = l(w0) and t(wi) = z for all i such that wi  w0;
- r(wi) = 0 and t(wi) = 0 for all i such that wi > w0.
Proof. From ICw for all wi > w0 we know wi=argmax bwi>w0 t( bwi) wir( bwi):
We can dene the maximum function U(wi)=max bwi>w0 t( bwi)   wir( bwi) and
applying the envelope theorem, dUdwi =  r(wi): Then we can rewrite U(wi) =
U(w) +
R w
wi
r( ewi)d ewi and t(wi)  wir(wi) = U(w) + R wwi r( ewi)d ewi:
t(wi) = U(w) + wir(wi) +
Z w
wi
r( ewi)d ewi:
Given our previous results, the principals objective function can be rewrit-
ten as jIj
n
F (w0)t(w0) +
R w
w0
t(wi)f(wi)dwi
o
: Replacing t(wi) by the expression
above, and after some manipulation, we obtain
jIj
(
F (w0)t(w0) + [1  F (w0)]U(w) +
Z w
w0
r(wi)

wi +
F (wi)  F (w0)
f(wi)

f(wi)dwi
)
:
From PCw for wi  w0, we know that the only potentially binding condition
is t(w0)  kh(r(w0))  w0r(w0)  kh(r(w0)), t(w0)  w0r(w0):
From PCw for wi > w0,.we have that U(w)  0 (it is easy to prove that this
constraint is binding and we incorporate it into the problem).
Finally, from MIw for wi  w0, we have that t(w0)  z:
We have already incorporated all the relevant ICw constraints into the prob-
lem and we ignore MIw for wi > w0 for now.
The problem thus becomes:
min jIj
n
F (w0)t(w0) +
R w
w0
r(wi)
h
wi +
F (wi) F (w0)
f(wi)
i
f(wi)dwi
o
s.t. t(w0)  w0r(w0)
t(w0)  z
Regardless of the value of w0, since
h
wi +
F (wi) F (w0)
f(wi)
i
f(wi) > 0 for all
wi > w0; it is optimal to set r(wi) = 0 and therefore t(wi) = 0 for all wi > w0:
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Therefore, t(w0) = max fz; w0r(w0)g : We only need to determine w0. If
z > w0r(w0); it would be optimal to revert to the welfare case. For z  w0r(w0);
t(w0) is minimized for w0 such that z = w0r(w0) = w0l(w0) and the total cost
of the program is jIjF (w0)z = jIjF (w0)w0r(w0) < jIj z. Therefore, the optimal
w0 is such that z = w0r(w0):
This analysis suggests that, given an exogenous cost of designing and im-
plementing the program, a workfare policy might be ine¢ cient in the context
of underdeveloped countries where income distribution exhibits strong inequal-
ities and large number of agents exhibit a low income-generating ability; it may
however be appropriate for countries with a fair distribution of income, where
there are larger savings due to the introduction of workfare.
5 Conclusion
We explore the potential of workfare as a screening instrument based on a com-
parison with standard monitoring. The cost of using workfare in this model is
that it reduces the amount of labor in the private-sector, increasing the poverty
gap and, consequently, the costs of the program. However, it may reduce trans-
fers to the non-poor and this benet may exceed the cost stemming from the
reduced private-sector earnings.
We show that the informational environment is crucial for the determina-
tion of the optimal program. When only labor disutility is unobservable, a
cost-minimizing PAP does not include workfare. Thus, monitoring may be the
best policy, depending on its cost function. However, in the case of very poor
economies with limited monitoring ability, it is not an optimal policy. In those
situations, the cost-minimizing PAP would then be the pure welfare program.
If only income-generating ability is unobservable, the optimal program may use
monitoring or workfare. The results depend not only on the monitoring cost
function but also on the distribution of income among people in the economy.
Our analysis suggests that a workfare policy may be e¢ cient in the context of
economies with a reduced number of poor agents, where the savings on infor-
mational rents exceed the costs due to lower private-sector earnings.
Our analysis also suggest that the results on workfare achieved in a two-type
model by Besley and Coate (1992) are very similar to those of our continuum
of types model.
Future research may shed additional light on this comparison for the two-
dimensional problem, where both income-generating ability and labor disutility
are unobservable. The results we have achieved suggest that a mixed policy
combining monitoring and workfare will generally be superior to welfare only
solutions (giving the minimum income level to all agents in the economy), jus-
tifying the need to further the study of these two instruments.
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